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Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

regulations adopted under the Coastal Area Facility Review Act was
misplaced. The regulations stated that coastal development adjacent
to all coastal waters must provide "[a]ccess to the waterfront to the
maximum extent practicable, including both visual and physical
access." The court held the regulation did not impose an absolute
prohibition against oceanfront development that interfered with the
view of inland property owners.
ElaineSoltis

NEW YORK
United Water New Rochelle, Inc. v. City of New York, 687 N.Y.S.2d
576 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (holding that contract provisions allowing the
City to unilaterally discontinue water delivery to utility were
unenforceable, contract provisions govern City's obligation to
chlorinate water, and City is not entitled to recompense for the value
of water they discarded in order to fulfill their obligations).
United Water New Rochelle ("United Water"), a privately owned
public utility, and Briarcliff, a municipal corporation, supplied water to
residents and businesses within its borders. New York City ("City") and
its administrative agency, the Department of Environmental Protection
("DEP"), oversaw and administered New York's statewide water system.
The City and DEP controlled much of the water flowing through New
York's system of rivers, lakes, reservoirs, and aqueducts, including the
Catskill and Croton Aqueducts. The City and DEP issued permits to
United Water and Briarcliff allowing them to tap into the Croton and
Catskill Aqueducts. United Water and Briarcliff received most of its
water from these aqueducts.
The City's contract with United Water provided for partial chloride
treatment of the water from the Croton Aqueduct. Briarcliff's contract
with the City did not create an obligation for the City to chlorinate the
water. The contracts specified that both United Water and Briarcliff
were responsible for final chlorination at their own facilities. In July
1998, the DEP notified Briarcliff and United Water that it intended to
shut down the aqueducts during September, the peak demand period
of the year, in order to make repairs and provide better quality water.
The health and safety risks to residents as a result of a prolonged
shutdown caused United Water and Briarcliff concern.
United Water and Briarcliff sought declaratory and injunctive
relief regarding the City's ability to shutdown the aqueduct. They
argued that they were contractually entitled to receive potable water
and requested the court to determine whether the City was obligated
to chlorinate water in the aqueduct. The City counterclaimed to
recover the value of potable water that United Water and Briarcliff
discarded. The City agreed to continue supplying potable water in the
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aqueduct until the matters were resolved. The parties then sought a
judicial determination of their rights in order to avoid future conflict
and litigation.
The court considered: (1) whether the contractual provisions
allowing the City to unilaterally discontinue water delivery were
unenforceable and invalid as contrary to public policy; (2) the City's
obligations concerning the chlorination of the water in the Croton
Aqueduct for United Water's and Briarcliff's use; and (3) whether
United Water or Briarcliff was unjustly enriched by discarded water.
The court held that the contract provision allowing the City to
unilaterally discontinue delivery of potable water to United Water and
Briarcliff was unenforceable and invalid on public policy grounds.
The courts will not enforce contracts that injuriously affect the public
interest.
The court recognized that the City could not deny
applications from municipal corporations and water districts to tap
into its system, but could establish reasonable rules and regulations
governing the means by which the water was taken and the quantity.
The court reasoned that because United Water and Briarcliff had
limited alternative water sources and water storage capacity, a shortage
during the peak demand period could pose severe health and safety
risks for the communities served.
The court next considered whether the City was obligated to
chlorinate water in the Croton Aqueduct. The court held that the City
was not required to chemically treat the water as a condition of the
State's delegation of eminent domain power. The court stated that the
issue was one of cost, not public policy, and that unlike the obligations
to permit access to and delivery of water, the City's obligations to
chlorinate was established by the parties in the terms of their contracts.
The court determined that according to United Water's permit,
the City was contractually bound to partially chlorinate the water
available from the aqueduct. Because of the provision, United Water
was not unjustly enriched, and not liable to the City for the cost of
water discarded in order to fulfill the City's contractual obligations.
Briarcliff, however, had no contractual provision requiring the City to
chlorinate the water made available to them. Briarcliff asserted that
the City could have provided a reduced volume of potable water
without waste. The court remanded to determine whether Briarcliff
was liable to the City for discarded water, and if so, how much it owed.
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Vinciguerra v. State of New York, 693 N.Y.S. 2d 634 (1999) (holding
that head wall and culvert constructed partially on landowners'
property by State was not a de facto appropriation, and resulted in
acquisition of a prescriptive drainage easement).
Claimants purchased eight parcels of vacant, undeveloped land

